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文章标签 ‘Google’

google calendar上同步到e61手机

2010年7月1日 华斐 13 条评论

看了万戈博客上的Google日历的API,忽然想到新买的那个E61上面的日历是不是也能和Google Calendar同步呢?嘿嘿!还是给我发现鸟…..且看我一步一步做。

1、首先要有Google账号并开通GoogleCalendar服务。这个对于Gfans来说不难吧,就不讲了。

2、注册GooSync(http://www.goosync.com),注册过程很简单,记得要选free的帐号,需要注意的是必须通过邮件验证才能正常登录。

3、打开邮件中的激活链接,按Continue,输入用户名和密码登录GooSync,然后授权GooSync访问你的GoogleCalendar,按Authorize,转到Google,用你的Google账户登录,按授予访问权,回到GooSync,提示AuthenticationwithGoogleCalendarsuccessful.授权成功。

4.接下来的设置在手机上就可以完成,打开连接功能-同步处理,新建一个同步情景模式:

      同步情景-模式名称:goosync(任意)

应用程序-仅同步日历,远程数据库:Calendar

连接设置-主机地址:http://sync.goosync.com

用户名:你的GooSync用户名

密码:你的GooSync密码

其他默认,接入点支持cmwap

 

5.准备工作全部搞定,现在就可以让你的E61与Google日历进行同步了,还不快来试试!?

6.需要说明的是,GooSync这项服务是免费的,但是免费的东西都是有限制的,你只能同步日程到一个Google日历,时间限制为过去7天和未来30天的数据,而且不能同步联系人。

谷歌浏览器Google Chromer插件推荐

2010年3月3日 华斐 1 条评论

一个下午的时间都在Google Chrome插件扩展页面浏览插件,有许多比较好玩的。有日历提醒、Google Reader 提醒等等插件,下面就推荐我觉得好用的几款。

1、气泡翻译 ——Bubble Translate

很多网友都领教过Chrome无法使用翻译软件的尴尬,反正笔者测试过的金山词霸、灵格斯肯定没有办法。于是便有高人想出了这样一个主意,即用Google Translate翻译Chrome上的文字,估计这大概也算是“以彼之矛攻彼之盾”了。插件的使用非常简单,安装好后会自动打开设置窗口,其中最关键的就是翻译热键的选择(默认为“Ctrl+选择”),我们可以根据习惯指定相关快捷键。同时它的使用也很方便,只要按下快捷键并用鼠标勾选,即可弹出勾选区域的翻译。此外它还提供了网页全屏翻译,当然使用的也是Google Translate。

2、GMail提醒 —— Google Mail Checker Plus

事实上Gmail提醒并不是什么新鲜话题,在官方的扩展网站上也有很多类似的扩展。之所以选择它,除了因为可以实时报告Gmail中的新邮件外,最大一个特点是能够直接进行邮件预览。而且除此之外,我们还可以通过预览栏快速完成“标识已读”、“一键删除”、“邮件回复”、“邮件展开(默认只会显示一部分内容)”等常用操作,甚至可以在这里直接完成新邮件撰写!

3、Google Reader提醒 ——Google Reader Checker

顾名思义,就是检测你Google阅读器里有多少未读的条目,和Gmail Checker一样,也是显示在地址栏右边!

4、代理插件——Proxy Switchy

   不用说得很清楚了,Goolge Chromer下的代理插件,Firfox下的AotoProxy差不多的功能吧!配置虽然有些麻烦,但还是聊胜于无吧!具体的安装配置搜索了一下,点这里传送。(插件下载地址打不开的话,想办法翻出去下载吧!)

 

现在用的就这几个插件了,用多了估计也占资源。

什么是 Google App Engine?

2010年1月15日 华斐 2 条评论

最近百度和Google被推到国内互联网的风尖浪口,最近为了FAN墙,知道了Google的好多在线功能,成为了一个新Gfans.Google有很多的产品发布,今天就先介绍Google App Engine吧!

什么是Google App Engine?

Google App Engine 可让您在 Google 的基础架构上运行您的网络应用程序。App Engine 应用程序易于构建和维护,并可根据您的访问量和数据存储需要的增长轻松扩展。使用 Google App Engine,将不再需要维护服务器:您只需上传您的应用程序,它便可立即为您的用户提供服务。

您可以使用 Google 企业应用套件通过自己的域名(例如 http://www.example.com/)提供应用程序。或者,您可以使用 appspot.com域上的免费域名来为您的应用程序提供服务。您可以与全世界的人共享您的应用程序,也可以限制为只有贵组织的成员可以访问。

Google App Engine 支持以几种编程语言编写的应用程序。通过 App Engine 的 Java 运行时环境,您可以使用标准 Java 技术(包括 JVM、Java servlet 和 Java 编程语言,或使用基于 JVM 的解释器或解译器的任何其他语言,例如 JavaScript 或 Ruby)构建应用程序。App Engine 还提供一个专用的 Python 运行时环境,该环境包括一个快速 Python 解释器和 Python 标准库。Java 和 Python 运行时环境构建为确保应用程序快速、安全运行,并不受系统上的其他应用程序的干扰。

在 App Engine 中,您只需为您使用的资源付费。没有设置成本,也没有重复的费用。您的应用程序使用的资源,如存储空间和带宽以千兆字节衡量,并以有竞争力的费率收费。您可以控制您的应用程序可以消费的最大资源量,使其一直保持在预算范围内。

可以免费开始使用 App Engine。所有应用程序都可以使用多达 500 MB 的存储空间,以及可支持每月约 500 万页面浏览量的足够的 CPU 和带宽,完全免费。为您的应用程序启用付费后,您的免费配额将提高,您只需为使用的超过免费水平的资源付费。

阅读全文…

A new approach to China[转自Google官方博客]

2010年1月13日 华斐 没有评论

Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.

First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.

Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers.

We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve’s blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.

We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China’s economic reform programs and its citizens’ entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.

We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China."
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.

The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.

Posted by David Drummond, SVP, Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer

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